Кстати, что такое “lexical priority”?

THE BASIC PREMISES OF VALUE PLURALISM
Five propositions will clarify the basic thrust of value pluralism. First, value pluralism is offered as an ac¬count of the actual structure of the normative universe. It advances a truth-CLAIM about that structure, not a description of the perplexity we feel in the face of divergent accounts of what is valuable. As does monism, it advances a "realist CLAIM about the metaphysical structure of value".

Many philosophers argue for value pluralism by pointing to the multiplicity of sources of morality. For example, Larmore suggests there are three kinds of valid moral CLAIMS—particularistic duties, aggregate consequences, and universal ("deontological") rules of conduct—that cannot be reduced to a common measure and whose relative weight depends on circumstances. To this list Nagel adds two others: "perfectionist" CLAIMS based on the intrinsic value of certain achieve¬ments and creations and CLAIMS based on commitments to personal projects and undertakings, especially core commitments that help define our identities.

Unresolvable conflicts may break out not only be¬tween but also within types of CLAIMS.

Someone who opposes the construction of a dam on the grounds that the species of animal thereby destroyed has intrinsic value would rightly resist the CLAIM that his belief is nothing more than a want to be satisfied: "

In this respect, public life mirrors the structure of private life. During policy disputes, the contending forces typically appeal to competing goods and princi¬ples, each of which has prima facie moral weight. In many cases, there is no obvious way to reduce these diverse considerations to a common measure of value or to give one CLAIM lexical priority over others. The most difficult political choices are not between good and bad but between good and good.

At issue is the observed structure of the many value conflicts that do not appeal to a shared good or value and cannot be resolved by quantitative CLAIMS of the form that option A is more promotive of the (shared) good or value than is option B.
If Berlin's account of value plural¬ism is correct, Gray concludes, then liberal democracy cannot sustain its universalist CLAIMS and emerges as but one form (among many others) of valid political association.