 |
|
Subject: coherence account notar. Amongst those legal theorists taking an interest in the role of coherence in legal reasoning, there is general agreement both that the coherence in question must amount to more than logical consistency amongst propositions and that it is not clear from many \coherence accounts\ exactly what this something more amounts to
|
|
Raz 1994a contends that \coherence accounts\, when applied to law, require a ‘base’ or something which is to be made coherent, which differs in character in some crucial respects from the sort of base which features in coherence accounts in other areas of philosophy. Raz points out that while \coherence accounts\ of justified belief take each person's belief set as their ‘base’ or as that which is to be made coherent, \coherence accounts\ of law cannot be person-relative in this way, on pain of failing to offer an account which is in touch with the concrete reality of law in the jurisdiction under consideration Это когерентные объяснения? |
|
имхо, не объяснения. а что-то типа "концепция" (понимание...) см. "The two theories also give conflicting accounts of truth conditions. According to the coherence theory, the truth conditions of propositions consist in other propositions. The correspondence theory, in contrast, states that the truth conditions of propositions are not (in general) propositions, but rather objective features of the world. |
|
Раз (в 1994а) настаивает на том, что соображения когерентности, если их применяют по отношению к праву, требуют 'обоснование' или что-либо, что должно быть оформлено логически обоснованным. Это 'обоснование', как правило, отличается в некоторых существенных аспектах от того примера обоснования, которое проявляет себя в соображениях когерентности в других областях философии; далее coherent уже следование общепринятым правилам, а account действительно субъективное (вторичное) - "что-то типа "концепция" (понимание...)" |
| You need to be logged in to post in the forum |